

## **THE ROLE OF SELECTED INTERNATIONAL DONOR AGENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA**

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**Abstract:** *The study examined the role of selected international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States. Since the colonial era, some policies and programmes within national development plans have been formulated to address the peculiarities of the region; minority status, agitations and perceived marginalization of the people of the Niger Delta, while the general objective of the study was to examine the role of selected international donor agencies in the development of the Niger Delta Region with a focus on Delta and Edo States. The study adopted the ex-post facto research design. Data were acquired by administering questionnaire among the residents of study area using random sampling method and descriptive statistics was used to explain the frequencies of variables being expressed in percentages. The findings of the study revealed that identified corruption and bad governance, political and ethnic interest in developmental projects, climatic factors, poor infrastructural foundations and the expanding insecurity as critical developmental challenges affecting the survival of projects and programmes in the oil producing states. Some recommendations were made: International donor agencies should intensify more effort to formulate policies and programmes to address developmental challenges in Delta and Edo States; International donor agencies should design programme to broaden the knowledge of leaders in the states; Delta and Edo states government should give the international donor agencies free hand to work and execute projects in the states; execution and citing of project should not be based on political influence, donor interest, but driven out of the crucial needs of the people.*

**Keywords:** *International donor agencies, development, political influence, Niger Delta Region*

### **Introduction**

The unique characteristics of Delta and Edo States in the Niger Delta region make special development efforts imperative. This need was first recommended by the Willink Commission instituted by the British Colonial Government in 1957. The Committee's report gave birth to the Niger Delta Development Board. Although the Commission drew up a programme of action, the political and electoral crises of the first republic, which culminated in the Nigerian Civil War made the board to die a natural death. In the post-civil war military administration, there were controversies about whether or not the board should be resuscitated. What emerged from the controversies was that nothing was done during this era to tackle the Niger Delta unique developmental issue (Akhigbe, 2013). Consequently, the agitations by the people of the region continued; this time accentuated by the increasing exploitation of oil and gas, their increasing profile in the revenue of the nation and the adverse effects on the Niger Delta environment. In 1980 the Shagari administration created the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority. The Authority which made no obvious impact on the lives of the people increased their frustrations and gave rise to serious agitations. This time, the exploration of oil had commenced on a very large scale

with the government earning huge revenue from it. Thus the neglect of the region was becoming very glaring. In response to the growing need for development, the Shagari administration established the Presidential Task Force, mainly due to the protracted legal battles between the Nigerian Federal Government and the Government of the defunct Bendel State (now Delta and Edo states), which prevented the disbursement of the 1.5 percent approved for the rehabilitation of the oil producing states, the Task Force was highly incapacitated all through its existence (Suberu, 1992).

Delta and Edo states are two among the nine states located in the Niger Delta region. Both States occupy a surface area of about 23, 201 sq.km of the entire 112, 110sq-km of the Niger Delta region. In 2018, the population of this region was estimated to be over 40 million, the overwhelming proportion of which is rural and poor (Kashi & Watts, 2006). Settlement patterns across the Niger Delta Region including Delta and Edo states have been shaped by the terrain, hydrology and flooding patterns within the massive deltaic basin. Many areas in both Delta and Edo States have developed on islands of drier terrain at the heads of navigable estuaries but in general, the population is predominantly rural. According to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the population of the Niger Delta region continues to grow very rapidly 3.1 percent per year and is projected to be over 45 million by 2020. The Niger Delta Region has been attractive to major international oil companies including Shell, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Elf, Agip and Texaco among others that have been involved in joint ventures with the Federal Government in connection with oil exploration, exploitation and production in the area. Links between their operations and human deprivation in the region has raised expectations that the oil companies should contribute to the physical and human development in affected communities Other expectations include the monitoring and promotion of respect for human rights, compliance with environmental standards for exploration and exploitation and where necessary, restitution for damages. Rather the oil companies, particularly Shell Petroleum, have operated for over 30 years without appreciable control or environmental regulation to guide their activities (Akpomuvie, 2011). By and large, the accessible social improvement markers in the Niger Delta locale highlight the shortage of foundation and social administrations, from water to broadcast communications. The recorded disregard of the district's advancement represents a precarious hindrance to accomplishing financial change and destitution mitigation around there (UNDP, 2006). Information from the Federal Office of Statistics, presently the National Bureau of Statistics, uncovered that water in most of the Niger Delta States, come from hazardous inventory offices including; streams, lakes or lakes, unprotected wells and drill openings. The Bureau classifies available sources of potable water for household consumption as; pipe borne, untreated pipe borehole, protected well, river/lake/pond, vendor trucks and other categories. The advent of development commission by Delta and Edo States namely Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission (DESOPADEC) and Edo State Oil and Gas Producing Areas Development Commission (EDSOGADEC) respectively have yielded little or no effort.

A significant objective of foreign, otherwise referred to as international donors intervention in developing countries is the promotion of economic development and welfare, usually measured by its impact on economic growth and development. (Audretsch & Feldman 2016) said the premise that African countries are poor and cannot be developed without external intervention from the developed West has brought about the involvement

of both bilateral and multilateral donor agencies in the development process of many African countries. The interventions have mainly being in form of the injection of capital into certain sectors of the economies of African states. However, some donor partners have also intervened directly in certain programmes and projects in the developing countries, thereby completing government efforts in the development process Umaru, (2012). Amsden (1997) maintained that, after the Nigerian independence in 1960, many bilateral and multilateral donor partners have responded to the development needs of the country by way of intervening in developmental programmes and projects. Anam, (2014) argued that, the micro-project programmes (MPP6) as a poverty alleviation strategy initiative has raised people's productivity and creativity and enhanced entrepreneurship and technological advancement. In addition, it plays a very crucial role in securing economic and social progress and improving income distribution in Cross River State (Becker, 2008). Also as set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005), effective aid requires the mutual commitment that partner countries exercise leadership in developing and implementing national development strategies through broad-based consultative processes and that donors respect country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it. In promoting the pro-poor growth agenda, donors should focus on assisting partner countries to develop and implement nationally owned poverty reduction strategies suited to the local context through processes that strengthen the social contract in favour of pro-poor growth. Donors may help to ensure that poverty reduction strategies better integrate pro-poor growth with progress on other dimensions of poverty. Support for these policy processes should form the basis of policy dialogue between donors and partner country governments. The outcomes of the policy making process and the policy dialogue should, in turn, be reflected in donors' country assistance strategies and the design of programmes, helping to make them better aligned and more relevant to country-led processes OECD (2007). This study will thus examine the role of international donor partners in the development of Delta and Edo States

### **Statement of the Problem**

The Niger Delta today is a position of disappointed assumptions and profound established question where extraordinary anxiety now and again ejects in brutality. Long periods of disregard and struggle have encouraged an attack mindset, particularly among the young people who feel they are sentenced to a future without expectation and consider struggle to be a technique to get away from hardship. Industrious clash while to some extent, a reaction to helpless human improvement has likewise dug in it, in this way filling in as a predictable drag on the locale's monetary exhibition and assumptions for headway. Outrageous neediness has been an essential element of the financial advancement of the Niger Delta since the mid 1970s. This is particularly so for the rustic populaces whose profitability has gotten dynamically undermined due fundamentally to natural contamination (Timi, 2016). The income that gathers from oil deals goes to the administrations, thus the public authority bears a significant part of the obligation regarding the natural insurance of the oil delivering regions and the improvement of the way of life for individuals around there. This makes political activity vital to the arrangement of human security and the assurance of the climate of the Niger Delta, the two of which are fundamental to compromise around there. The job of government during the time spent

tracking down an enduring answer for the ecological decimation of the Niger Delta is a perplexing one, considering the way that an administration organization, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), capacities as a joint endeavor accomplice to the oil delivering organizations in Nigeria. The NNPC and its auxiliaries address government interest and gather its rents in the creation and offer of oil and gas. In this way, the ecological peril that oil creation presents regularly comes against the interest of government (Ukaogo, 2008). Further hazardously, this irreconcilable situation is set against the foundation of a culture of debasement that has portrayed public life in Nigeria, particularly the oil area (Falola and Heaton 2008). It is for the most part realized that the oil creating organizations in Nigeria don't meet the fundamental worldwide laws expected of offices directing oil investigation and abuse. This is obviously demonstrated by the unnecessary level of gas erupted during the time spent oil misuse. Neither do the oil organizations have the ability to forestall or deal with the various instances of oil spillage. More often than not, the little that is harmed the climate following an oil slick is attempted solely after vicious fights by nearby networks. The Nigerian government has similarly exhibited an absence of will to force consistence with the principles in light of its own advantages. It is just somewhat recently or with the goal that conclusive advances have started to be taken to ensure the climate. Indeed, even such activity was just motivated after monstrous vicious activity taken by individuals of the Niger Delta locale to force the public authority to react, and the reaction has yielded just unobtrusive outcomes.

While worldwide giver accomplices have as of late entered to aid the formative difficulties in the Niger Delta locale, their job and accomplishment has not come without some type of reactions, regardless of what is by all accounts a certifiable endeavors on paper to help and advance improvement in the Niger Delta area, such exertion has been seen as another interventionist methodology that tries to additionally revered the reliance circle to which most agricultural nations has come to relate all global advancement aide programs. Many have contended that the majority of the global oil organizations that is blamable for the formative troubles of individuals of the Niger Delta area are likewise from the parent nations of most benefactor offices who has come to go about as a holy person' or 'savior' for the neediness stricken individuals of the Niger Delta district. The tangible logical inconsistencies has put paid to the genuine state or intensions of worldwide giver offices in the advancement of the Niger Delta area. Yet, one can't totally excuse the endeavors of some global giver offices dependent on some noticeable proof of their exercises regarding advancement in the space of limit building, local area improvement activities, arrangement of fundamental necessities and so forth However, most intercession of these contributors are of their own advantages, instead of individuals they claim to help. It is against this setting that this investigation analyzed the job of chosen worldwide benefactor organizations in the advancement of chose states in the Niger Delta locale with an emphasis on Delta and Edo states.

### **Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of the study was to examine the role of selected international donor agencies in the development of the Niger Delta Region with a focus on Delta and Edo states. The specific objectives are to:

- i. Explore the development challenges of Delta and Edo States as oil producing States.
- ii. Examine the development focus, rationale and objectives of international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States.
- iii. Evaluate the impact of the development goals of international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States.
- iv. Identify and discuss the challenges confronting international donor agencies in promoting development/achieving developmental goals in Delta and Edo States.

### **Hypotheses**

The following research hypotheses were stated and tested in the study

*HO1: There is no significant relationship between poor developmental focus and development in Delta and Edo States.*

*HO2: There is no significant difference between what constitute the development focus, rationale and objectives of international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States*

*HO3: There is no significant relationship between volatile nature of the environment and ability of international donor agencies to promote development in Delta and Edo States.*

*HO4: There is no significant relationship between politicization of aid programme and ability of international donor agencies to promote development in Delta and Edo States.*

### **Literature Review**

The question of what help means for practical development and improvement in agricultural nations has been fervently bantered in the course of the most recent twenty years. This has prompted observational assessments of the guide development relationship. Nonetheless, there is still minimal observational writing on unfamiliar guide – the narrative of development. While a few examinations discover no impacts, different discoveries show a positive and solid relationship and others have discovered negative connection among help and financial development. Among contemplates that discover positive and adverse consequences of unfamiliar guide on monetary development in beneficiary economies, are those which determine its restrictive and unrestricted impacts on advancement. Studies that state an adverse consequence of help on advancement refers to, in addition to other things that guide is driven by geo-political inspirations as opposed to by selfless endeavours. All things considered, regardless of the substantial analysis on advancement help, the upgrades help has caused in the arrangement of foundation, wellbeing offices, training, disinfection, and the profitability of farming are evident (Arndt, Jones, and Tarp, 2007; Sachs, 2014). A few endeavours have been made to clarify the noticed dissimilarity in the guide development writing (See Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi, 2011).

The powerful examination by Burnside and Dollar (2000), a preliminary in the contingent strand of writing on the guide development relationship, find that guide causes development just in nations that keep up low expansion, are available to exchange, has a changed monetary area and run low spending deficiencies. Some different examinations distinguished conditionalities to the guide development relationship, noticing that the viability of help is contingent on the presence of fare value stuns (Collier and Dehn, 2001), environment stuns just as instability in the terms of exchange (Guillaumont and Chauvet,

2001), financial strategy and institutional quality (Collier and Dollar, 2002; Heckelman and Knack, 2008), extremist government (Islam, 2003), institutional quality (Burnside and Dollar, 2004), arrangement and government assistance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Then again, the works of Easterly (2003), Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) and Roodman (2007) cast defamations on the contingent strand, focusing on that the meaning of connection impacts in such investigations might be an after effect of augmentations in dataset just as persuasive perceptions. Different investigations look at the unlimited impacts of help on improvement. By and large, these investigations place that the powerlessness to arrange a constructive outcome of help on development can be credited to determination issues and period considered. Noticing the chance of positive just as consistent losses, the greater part of such examinations inspect nonlinearity in the guide development relationship. For example, Hadjimichael, Ghura, Muhleisen, Nord, and Ucer (1995) discover a fundamentally certain effect of help with unavoidable losses in a summed up least squares cross segment of 31 African nations, over the time frame 1986-1992. Other remarkable examinations incorporate those of Hansen and Tarp (2000), Lensink and Morrissey (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Lensink and White (2001), Clements, Gupta, Pivovarsky, and Tiongson (2004), Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), Moreira (2005), Werker, Ahmed and Cohen (2009) *entomb alia*.

Lensink and Morrissey (2000) incorporated a union term in their relapses on a cross part of 75 nations and discover an emphatically huge, positive, direct connection among help and development. In any case, the investigation further contended that vulnerabilities encompassing the size and timing of help could contrarily affect on venture and financial development. Utilizing a recognizable proof technique which inclines toward the constancy of help and the shortfall of direct consequences for current development from slacked help, Hansen, and Tarp (2001) tracked down a solid, non-straight effect of instrumented help development that isn't dependent upon compelling perceptions. The examination by Lensink and White (2001), with the utilization of a two-stage least square assessor, affirms the non-direct effect of help on development in an example of 111 nations over the time frame 1975-1992. Essentially, in relapses instrumented with slacked help streams, Clements et al. (2004) track down a positive, unrestricted, nonlinear, causal connection among help and development. Despite the fact that, Dalgaard et al. (2004) perceived the huge connection between unfamiliar guide and part of land in the jungles, the examination tracked down an unlimited positive and nonlinear impact of help without the collaboration (Clemens et al., 2011). Moreira (2005), utilizing differenced GMM assessors for year 1998, discover a profoundly huge, positive, and non-direct effect of help in 48 nations.

The gathering of studies which discovered no connection for the development help examination actually proposed a reconsidering in the authority advancement help worldview. As per Boone (1996) improvement help has no impact on venture, development, and advancement results, making the minimal affinity to devour help unimportant and minor inclination to contribute zero. At the point when exceptions (compelling perceptions) are taken out from information tests, help will in general no affect development (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004). In the wake of instrumenting for help with the utilization of nation size and political connections to givers, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) additionally settled no-development proof. Also, utilizing a more intricate information to propel crafted by Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly et

al. (2004) find that guide doesn't advance monetary development, great arrangement climate in any case. In any case, it is relevant to take note of that the no-development proof announced in certain investigations as referred to above doesn't suggest that, with sound strategy and institutional changes, beneficiary nations can't have a positive guide development experience (See Barro, 1991; Ayodele, Cudjoe, Nolutshungu, and Sunwabe, 2005).

Among contemplates that feature the adverse consequences of unfamiliar guide on development, there are contentions for its Dutch infection impact, 2 effect on debasement, hosing impact on nature of establishments and administration, in beneficiary nations. There are likewise sees on the unavoidable losses of help on advancement by creators who place that there is a limit of help GDP proportion past which help may dial down viability. In this way, help streams are noted to expand help reliance and diminish government drive for homegrown asset activation. As indicated by Moss, Peterson and Van de Walle (2006), enormous and supported guide streams will in general effectsly affect the nature of establishments in low pay nations. Along these lines, unfamiliar guide will in general block financial development in nations with feeble foundations, poor money related strategies, high paces of debasement, awful administration or hose the viability of help to non-industrial nations (World Bank, 1998; Svensson, 1999). Help viability for producing financial advancement in low pay nations is contingent on acceptable arrangements just as very much planned and carried out guide programs (Burnside and Dollar, 1997, 2000; Radelet, 2006).

The examination by Clemens et al. (2011), which featured the significance of the kind and timing of help, show that guide impacts monetary development offering belief to the pretended by country explicit factors just as nature of the guide projects. Besides, multilateral guide is distributed generally for great arrangement conditions, despite the fact that two-sided help isn't really so allotted (Duc, 2006). Unfamiliar guide likewise impacts on sectoral intensity (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005; Feeny and Ouattara, 2009; Selaya and Thiele, 2010). While most investigations center on explicit area impacts, Selaya and Thiele (2010) discovered the impact of help on development rates at the total level just as its disaggregated consequences for the tradable and non-tradable areas. Amidt, Jones and Tarp (2007) concurred that the development in private and unfamiliar speculation has prompted important administration and financial control issues. Burnside and Dollar (1997) found that there exists a connection between unfamiliar help and financial improvement just when there are exacting guidelines at a fitting time and in a grounded strategy climate. Implying that where there is the presence of good monetary approaches unfamiliar guide will affect on financial turn of events (Collier and Dollar, 2000).

Whitaker (2006) discoveries showed that the way that enormous measures of unfamiliar guide has been sent by created countries and worldwide establishments yet there has been seen absence of result from this brings up the issue regarding the genuine viability of unfamiliar guide to less created country. The investigation had the option to confirm that unfamiliar guide had a constructive outcome yet factors like struggle and topography reduces the effect and can even make it negative. It was proposed by the Arellano, Buliø, Lane and Lipschitz (2009) that expanding unfamiliar guide streams by \$10 billion would lift around 25 million individuals out of neediness each year, given that such nations have sound financial administration. Djankov (2008) believed that unfamiliar help has a critical adverse consequence on the progressions in political establishments all the more explicitly

majority rules system. Besides, the OECD (1985) inspected 25 years of ODA and it found that notwithstanding difficulties in Sub-Saharan Africa and a few nations of Latin America, many non-industrial nations had accomplished momentous financial and social development over the past 25 years. It likewise found that guide, joined by developing fares to OECD nations, had fundamentally added to these additions. Conchesta (2008) utilized a solitary condition model to look at the effect of unfamiliar guide on financial development in Tanzania over the time frame 1990 to 2004. In his examination, while unfamiliar guide was disaggregated as far as government advancement uses and repetitive uses other joined factors incorporate net public investment funds, trade development and absolute obligation administration. The examination uncovers that unfamiliar guide and all out obligation administration adversely affect GDP development for the instance of Tanzania.

As per Riddell (2007), Aid tying which is related to project help causes the abuse of the agricultural nations since they are typically obliged to buy things from the contributor country. Unfamiliar guide is additionally liable to prompt the enthusiasm for the genuine conversion scale of the agricultural nations and this outcome into rising homegrown expansion. This is known to be the Dutch illness whereby an inflow of unfamiliar trade in type of fare profit, private capital inflows or unfamiliar guide squeezes the genuine swapping scale of the beneficiary agricultural nation. Unfamiliar guide may prompt the enthusiasm for the conversion scale of the beneficiary nation subsequently lessening the seriousness of the fare area. Fasanya & Onakoya (2012) analysed the impact of unfamiliar guide on Nigerian financial development during the time of 1970-2010. The exact investigation lays on the neo-old style demonstrating insightful structure and joined a few methodology in current econometric examination/assessment strategies. Their discoveries show that guide streams fundamentally affect monetary development in Nigeria: homegrown venture expanded because of help streams and populace development has no huge impact on guide streams. Subhayu, Sajal and Javed (2013) analyzed the impacts of ODA awards, concessional ODA credits, and private seaward bank advances on development paces of 131 agricultural countries more than 1996-2010 in a brought together manner. Their outcomes show a non-linearity in every one of the three connections, recommending that at low (undeniable) levels awards are better (more regrettable) than credits (concessional or private).

Burnside and Dollar (2000) in their examination of the connection between unfamiliar guide, financial approach, and development of per capital GDP found that guide decidedly affects development in agricultural nations with great financial, money related and exchange arrangements yet with little impact within the sight of helpless strategies. There are different investigations that show no significant relationship among help and development. Easterly (2005) discovered various outcomes when they added more information and expanded the year range from 1993 to 1997. Despite the fact that they don't really contend that guide is insufficient, they store that with the presentation of the new information, the positive connection among help and development wilts away. Okon (2012) attempted to take a gander at a drawn out viewpoint on advancement help and human improvement in Nigeria. The investigation utilizes two phase least squares assessment to breaking down information from 1960 to 2010. The outcome shows that there is a negative connection between advancement help and human turn of events, inferring that guide will in general deteriorate human improvement in Nigeria.

Chenery and Strout (1966) embracing experimental information from less created nations show that unfamiliar guide has a huge constructive outcome on the beneficiary country monetary development. Different analysts anyway have disturbed this, discoveries that undoubtedly unfamiliar guide adversely affects financial development of non-industrial nations as it contrarily influences monetary development by supplanting the nearby investment funds (Griffin, 1970; Leff, 1969). The fundamental contention is that unfamiliar guide in its adverse consequence counterbalances the upsides of moving assets and that it sabotages or debilitates administration by expanding the re-visitation of debasement or expansion in loaning for the agricultural nations. Bakare (2011), analyzed the degree of the effect of unfamiliar guide on financial development in Nigeria by utilizing standard measurable strategy, Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) to decide the wellsprings of stun to development in Nigeria and regarded unfamiliar guide as an endogenous variable. The investigation tracked down a negative connection between unfamiliar guide and yield development, which suggest that unfamiliar guide will in general demolish yield development in Nigeria as opposed to improving it. Mahmoud (2014) analyzed the Impact of Foreign Aid in Economic Development of non-industrial nations: an instance of Philippines Using FDI, GDP and ODA as intermediaries. His examination tracked down a positive effect among the factors contemplated. In any case, this examination is not the same as those audited on the grounds that it receives reciprocal guide as intermediary for unfamiliar guide while Human advancement record are intermediary for financial turn of events. The examination is from 2003 to 2015.

The topic of what help means for supported development and improvement in non-industrial nations has been the subject of warmed scholarly discussion in the course of recent many years. This has prompted experimental assessments of the guide development relationship. Nonetheless, the observational writing stays uncertain regarding the unfamiliar guide – development story. While a few examinations discover no impacts, different discoveries show a positive and solid relationship and others have discovered negative connection among help and monetary development. Among contemplates that discover positive and adverse consequences of unfamiliar guide on monetary development in beneficiary economies, are those which indicate its restrictive and unequivocal impacts on advancement. Studies that affirm an adverse consequence of help on improvement refers to, in addition to other things that guide is driven by geo-political inspirations as opposed to by selfless endeavours. By the by, regardless of the substantial analysis on advancement help, the enhancements help has caused in the arrangement of framework, wellbeing offices, schooling, disinfection, and the profitability of farming are certain (Arndt, Jones, and Tarp, 2007; Sachs, 2014). A few endeavours have been made to clarify the noticed dissimilarity in the guide development writing (See Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi, 2011).

The compelling investigation by Burnside and Dollar (2000), a groundwork in the restrictive strand of writing on the guide development relationship, find that guide causes development just in nations that keep up low expansion, are available to exchange, has a changed monetary area and run low spending deficiencies. Some different investigations distinguished restriction's to the guide development relationship, taking note of that the adequacy of help is contingent on the presence of fare value stuns (Collier and Dehn, 2001), environment stuns just as unpredictability in the terms of exchange (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001), financial arrangement and institutional quality (Collier and Dollar, 2002;

Heckelman and Knack, 2008), extremist government (Islam, 2003), institutional quality (Burnside and Dollar, 2004), approach and government assistance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Alternately, the works of Easterly (2003), Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) and Roodman (2007) cast slander on the restrictive strand, focusing on that the meaning of connection impacts in such investigations might be a consequence of expansions in dataset just as compelling perceptions. Different investigations analyze the unequivocal impacts of help on improvement. By and large, these investigations set that the powerlessness to arrange a constructive outcome of help on development can be credited to particular issues and period considered. Taking note of the chance of positive just as consistent losses, the vast majority of such examinations look at nonlinearity in the guide development relationship.

For example, Hadjimichael, Ghura, Muhleisen, Nord, and Ucer (1995) discover a fundamentally certain effect of help with unavoidable losses in a summed up least squares cross segment of 31 African nations, over the time frame 1986-1992. Other remarkable examinations incorporate those of Hansen and Tarp (2000), Lensink and Morrissey (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Lensink and White (2001), Clements, Gupta, Pivovarsky, and Tiongson (2004), Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), Moreira (2005), Werker, Ahmed and Cohen (2009) bury alia. Lensink and Morrissey (2000) incorporated a combination term in their relapses on a cross segment of 75 nations and discover an unequivocally critical, positive, straight connection among help and development. Notwithstanding, the examination further contended that vulnerabilities encompassing the size and timing of help could adversely affect on venture and financial development. Utilizing an ID methodology which inclines toward the ingenuity of help and the shortfall of direct consequences for current development from slacked help, Hansen, and Tarp (2001) tracked down a solid, non-straight effect of instrumented help development that isn't dependent upon persuasive perceptions. The examination by Lensink and White (2001), with the utilization of a two-stage least square assessor, affirms the non-direct effect of help on development in an example of 111 nations over the time frame 1975-1992. Also, in relapses instrumented with slacked help streams, Clements et al. (2004) track down a positive, genuine, nonlinear, causal connection among help and development. Despite the fact that, Dalgaard et al. (2004) perceived the huge connection between unfamiliar guide and part of land in the jungles, the investigation tracked down an unrestricted positive and nonlinear impact of help without the cooperation (Clemens et al., 2011). Moreira (2005), utilizing differenced GMM assessors for year 1998, discover a profoundly huge, positive, and non-straight effect of help in 48 nations. The gathering of studies that discovered no relationship for the guide development investigation consistently proposed a re-evaluating in the authority improvement help worldview. As indicated by Boone (1996) improvement help has no impact on speculation, development, and advancement results, making the peripheral affinity to devour help irrelevant and minor inclination to contribute zero. At the point when anomalies (powerful perceptions) are eliminated from information tests, help will in general no affect development (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004).

Observational investigations about the connection between unfamiliar guide and monetary development have likewise created conflicting and fairly subtle outcomes. On the significant inquiry of if help adds to advancement, the discussion is comprehensively partitioned into the individuals who trust it hurries improvement and the individuals who

trust it doesn't. Cassen and Associates (1994), Chenery and Carter (1973), Papanek (1973), Rostow (1960) and Sachs (2005), address one side of the separation that accepts that unfamiliar guide is an important condition for agricultural countries to accomplish take-off. There are, then again, the individuals who accept that unfamiliar guide has never really devastate the economies it should create, mutilate utilization, lower development rate, deteriorate disparities, incite debasement at the two closures, and so on (Bauer, 1981; Bhagwati, 1970; Boone, 1994, 1996; Dacy, 1975; Griffin and Enos 1970; and Mosley and Hudson, 1984). All the more as of late, there are essayists who are more intrigued by the political and 'world exchange' connotations of unfamiliar guide (Easterly, 2006; Chang, 2007; Moyo, 2009 and Stiglitz, 2002). They accept that, instead of assisting helpless African countries with creating, unfamiliar guide further ruins them.

## Methodology

The study adopts an Expost-facto research design using the mixed methods research approach. This means that quantitative and qualitative sources were utilized. The mixed methods approach was used for the study because the data used for the research comprises of both primary and secondary sources which include questionnaires to survey responses from respondents. The researcher administered questionnaires to individual and institutions in the selected States. These data was then complimented with secondary information obtained from documents, reports and government publications, e.t.c.

### Population of the Study

The study focused on Delta and Edo States in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria with a projected population of 9,899,000 in 2018 based on the 2006 population census figure. This projection is based on 3.2% annual growth rate as determined by National Population Commission (NPC), Abuja,(2018).

**Table 1 Delta and Edo States Population based on 2006**

| State | Year | Total population |
|-------|------|------------------|
| Delta | 2006 | 4,112,445        |
| Edo   | 2006 | 3,233,366        |

Source: National Population Commission of Nigeria (web), National Bureau of Statistics (web).

**Table 2 Delta and Edo States Population based on 2018 projection**

| State | Year            | Total population |
|-------|-----------------|------------------|
| Delta | 2018 Projection | 5,663,400        |
| Edo   | 2018 Projection | 4,235,600        |

Source: National Population Commission of Nigeria (web), National Bureau of Statistics (web) (2018).

## Sample and Sampling Techniques

A sample of 1000 respondents was used for this study. In selecting the sample size, the researcher adopts the stratified simple random sampling method. This method was used in order to get a representative opinion of the citizens of Delta and Edo States of Nigeria. As such, 50 respondents were randomly selected from 10 local Government Areas each chosen from Delta and Edo states giving a total of 1000. According to Harper (1977) "stratification lessens the possibility of inaccurate assessment" the subjects were randomly

selected from among the stratified groups of international donor partners' members, civil servants, youth Organizations, community leaders and women groups. 10 persons were randomly selected from each of the 5 group from the 20 Local Government Areas understudy, making a total of 1000 respondents from each local government area. In the observation technique, the researcher would visit most of the project sites of the European Union (EU), World Bank, United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) and Department for International Development (DFID) in Delta and Edo states to see the real things on ground such as signposts of donors' projects, equipment and the photograph of the projects. This offered real assessment of such projects.

### Validation and Reliability of Instruments

In order to enhance the validity and credibility of the questionnaire, five independent readers including my two supervisors in the Faculty of the Social Sciences were given copies of the questionnaire including the hypotheses tested, the research questions and the objectives of the study. To ensure the questionnaire's reliability, the study adopts 10% of the 1000 sample size amounting to 100 respondents. The test – retest method was used to administer the 100 questionnaires to two groups of respondents at different occasions within a span of 2 weeks interval in Sagbama Local Government Area of Bayelsa State, which was outside the study areas of Delta and Edo States, to justify the neutrality of the test group. The responses of the two groups were tested using the Cronbach Alpha to examine its consistency before embarking on the full scale field work. Below is the table presenting the reliability test result.

**Table 3 Pilot Study: Results for Reliability Test**

| Variable   | Items in Scale | Alpha Value | Remarks  |
|--|----------------|-------------|----------|
| Promoting Development in Oil Producing States                                      | 5              | 0.8322      | Reliable |
| Oil producing States Developmental Challenges                                      | 5              | 0.8435      | Reliable |
| Development Focus, Rationale, Goals and Objectives of International Donor Agencies | 5              | 0.8562      | Reliable |
| Development Challenges Confronting International Donor Agencies                    | 5              | 0.8456      | Reliable |
| Overall  | 20             | 0.8444      | Reliable |

Source: Fieldwork, 2020

Table 3.3 results present the Alpha values that ranged from approximately 0.8322 (See Promoting Development in Oil Producing States) to 0.8562 (see Development Focus, Rationale, Goals and Objectives of International Donor Partners) for the different sections of the instrument. The overall reliability coefficient value (all items/sections) is 0.8444. On this note, the study's research instrument is adjudged as reliable since the different coefficients obtained are more than the minimum threshold of 0.50.

### Method of Data Analysis

Data from secondary sources were collected as they exist in those sources and used to buttress our discussion where necessary, while the primary data was presented and

analyzed using descriptive statistics such as tables, percentages and inferential statistics such as correlation coefficient. Correlation analysis is the examination of two or more variables in order to determine the extent to which they are related. As a parametric technique of hypothesis testing, the choice of this statistical tool is based on the fact that, it summarizes not only the degree of relationship, but also the direction whether it is positive, negative or zero correlation. The Pearson's coefficient of correlation represented by the symbol 'r' was specifically used for this study. The Pearson's product moment correlation according to Sanubi (2011:148) is defined by the formula:

This formula is often shortened and written as:

$$r_{xy} = \frac{\Sigma(X - \bar{X})(Y - \bar{Y})}{\sqrt{\Sigma(X - \bar{X})^2 \Sigma(Y - \bar{Y})^2}}$$

This formula is often shortened and written as:

$$\frac{\Sigma xy}{\sqrt{\Sigma x^2 \Sigma y^2}}$$

Where x =  $\Sigma(X - \bar{X})$  = sum of deviation of X variable  
 y =  $\Sigma(Y - \bar{Y})$  = sum of deviation of Y variable  
 $x^2$  =  $\Sigma(X - \bar{X})^2$  = sum of squared deviation of X variables  
 $y^2$  =  $\Sigma(Y - \bar{Y})^2$  = sum of squared deviation of Y variables.  
 X = independent variable  
 Y = dependent variable

Where x = = sum of deviation of X variable  
 y = = sum of deviation of Y variable  
 $x^2$  = = sum of squared deviation of X variables  
 $y^2$  = = sum of squared deviation of Y variables.

X = independent variable  
 Y = dependent variable

Specifically, hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 were tested using the Pearson Correlation Coefficient. Hypothesis 2 was tested using Independent T-test of equality of mean. However, the statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS 20.0) was used to compute and analyze the data that were obtained in determining the correlation coefficient.

## Results

**Table 4 Respondents' Demographic Information from Delta and Edo States**

| S/N | Variables             | Category      | Frequency  | Percentage   |
|-----|-----------------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| 1   | Gender of Respondents | Male          | 427        | 54.5         |
|     |                       | Female        | 356        | 45.5         |
|     |                       | <b>Total</b>  | <b>783</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| 2   | Age of Respondents    | 18 – 25 years | 98         | 12.5         |
|     |                       | 26 – 30 years | 127        | 16.2         |
|     |                       | 31 – 35 years | 143        | 18.2         |

|   |   |                |            |              |
|---|---|----------------|------------|--------------|
|   |   | 36 – 40 years  | 154        | 19.7         |
|   |   | 41 – 45 years  | 139        | 17.8         |
|   |   | Above 45 years | 122        | 15.6         |
|   |   | <b>Total</b>   | <b>783</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| 3 | Marital Status of Respondents                         | Single         | 72         | 9.2          |
|   |   | Married        | 467        | 59.6         |
|   |   | Divorced       | 58         | 7.4          |
|   |   | Widowed        | 186        | 23.8         |
|   |   | <b>Total</b>   | <b>783</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| 4 | Educational Qualification of Respondents              | SSCE           | 66         | 8.4          |
|   |   | OND/NCE        | 181        | 23.1         |
|   |   | B.Sc./HND/B.Ed | 328        | 41.9         |
|   |   | M.Sc./MBA/Ph.D | 208        | 26.6         |
|   |   | <b>Total</b>   | <b>783</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| 5 | Respondents years of residing in Delta and Edo States | 1 – 5 years    | 134        | 17.1         |
|   |   | 6 – 10 years   | 146        | 18.6         |
|   |   | 11 – 15 years  | 169        | 21.7         |
|   |   | 16 – 20 years  | 156        | 19.9         |
|   |   | Above 20 years | 178        | 22.7         |
|   |   | <b>Total</b>   | <b>783</b> | <b>100.0</b> |

Source: Researcher's Fieldwork, 2020

*Gender of Respondents:* The table above shows that majority of the respondents are male, which are 427 in number making it a total of 54.5% of the respondents. Female respondents were 356, which consisting 45.5%.

*Age of Respondents:* Age group of 36 – 40 years which comprised of 154 (19.7%) accounted for the majority of the respondents. The remaining respondents which fell into age bracket of 31 – 35 years, 41 – 45 years, 26 – 30 years, above 45 years and 18 - 25 years accounted for 143 (18.2%) 139 (17.8%) 127 (16.2%), 122 (15.6%) and 98 (12.5%) respectively.

*Marital Status of Respondents:* Most respondents, representing 467 (59.6%) are married. 186 respondents are widowed. This group constituted 23.8% of the entire respondents. Respondents that was single were 72, representing 9.2% of the entire respondents, while respondents that have been divorced were 58, which constituted 7.4% of the total respondents.

*Educational Qualification of Respondents:* The majority of the respondents were B.Sc./HND/B.Ed. holders. These respondents accounted for 328 which constituted 41.9% of the entire respondents. Respondents with M.Sc./MBA/Ph.D degrees were 208 which represent 26.6%. Those with OND/NCE were 181 constituted 23.1% of the respondents while SSCE holders were 66, which constituted 8.4% of the total respondents.

*Respondents Years of Residing in Delta and Edo States:* Respondents with above 20 years of residing in Delta and Edo States accounted for 178 or 2.7% of the entire respondents

Test of Hypotheses

*H01: There is no significant relationship between oil producing states development challenges and promoting development in Delta and Edo States.*

**Table 5 Test of significant relationship between oil producing states development challenges and promoting development in Delta and Edo States**

|   |                     | Oil producing States Developmental Challenges | Promoting Development in Oil Producing States |
|---|---------------------|---|---|
| Oil producing States Developmental Challenges | Pearson Correlation | 1   | .818**  |
|   | Sig. (2-tailed)     |   | .000  |
|   | N                   | 783   | 783   |
| Promoting Development in Oil Producing States | Pearson Correlation | .818**  | 1   |
|   | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .000  |   |
|   | N                   | 783   | 783   |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Fieldwork, 2020

Table 2 shows a test of linear correlation result on the relationship between oil producing states development challenges and promoting development in Delta and Edo States. The result r-value of (r {783}0.818, p=0.000) reveals that the test is significant and positive. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, revealing that oil producing states development challenges has a positive and significant relationship with what promote development in Delta and Edo States.

*HO2: There is no significant difference between what constitute the development focus, rationale and objectives of international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States*

**Table 6 Test of significant difference between what constitute the development focus, rationale and objectives of international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States**

|  |                             | Levene's Test for Equality of Variances |      | t-test for Equality of Means |         |      |           |           |
|--|-----------------------------|---|------|------------------------------|---------|------|-----------|-----------|
|  |                             | F                                       | Sig. | T                            | df      | Sig. | Mean Diff | Std. Er D |
| Development Focus, Rationale, Goals and Objectives of International Donor Agencies | Equal variances assumed     | 3.117                                   | .078 | .791                         | 781     | .429 | -.04990   | .06312    |
|  | Equal variances not assumed |   |      | .794                         | 778.068 | .427 | -.04990   | .06284    |

Source: Fieldwork, 2020

Table 3 shows a t-test for the equality of mean difference between what constitute the development focus, rationale and objectives of international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States. The t-test value of (t {781}0.791, p=0.429) reveals that the test of the mean difference is not significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted, revealing that what constitute the development focus, rationale and objectives of international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States are the same. By implication, the development focus, rationale and objectives of international donor agencies in Delta and Edo State are the same.

*HO3: There is no significant relationship between the development goals and focus of international donor agencies and promoting development in Delta and Edo States.*

**Table 7 Test of significant relationship between the development goals and focus of international donor agencies and promoting development in Delta and Edo States.**

|  |                     | Development Focus, Rationale, Goals and Objectives of International Donor Agencies | Promoting Development in Oil Producing States |
|--|---------------------|--|---|
| Development Focus, Rationale, Goals and Objectives of International Donor Agencies | Pearson Correlation | 1  | .874**  |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed)     |  | .000  |
|  | N                   | 783  | 783   |
| Promoting Development in Oil Producing States                                      | Pearson Correlation | .874**   | 1   |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .000   |   |
|  | N                   | 783  | 783   |
| **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).                       |                     |  |   |

Source: Fieldwork, 2020

Table 4 shows a test of linear correlation result on the relationship between the development goals and focus of international donor agencies and promoting development in Delta and Edo States. The result r-value of (r {783}0.874, p=0.000) reveals that the test is significant and positive. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, revealing that the development goals and focus of international donor agencies has a positive and significant relationship with the extent development is promoted in Delta and Edo States

*HO4: There is no significant relationship between the development challenges confronting international donor agencies and promoting development in Delta and Edo States.*

**Table 8 Test of significant relationship between the development challenges confronting international donor agencies and promoting development in Delta and Edo States.**

|   |                     | Development Challenges Confronting International Donor Agencies | Promoting Development in Oil Producing States |
|---|---------------------|---|---|
| Development Challenges Confronting International Donor Agencies | Pearson Correlation | 1   | .838**  |
|   | Sig. (2-tailed)     |   | .000  |
|   | N                   | 783   | 783   |
| Promoting Development in Oil Producing States                   | Pearson Correlation | .838**  | 1   |
|   | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .000  |   |
|   | N                   | 783   | 783   |
| **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    |                     |   |   |

Source: Fieldwork, 2020

Table 5 shows a test of linear correlation result on the relationship between the development challenges confronting international donor agencies and promoting development in Delta and Edo States. The result r-value of (r {783}0.838, p=0.000) reveals that the test is significant and positive. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, revealing that the development challenges confronting international donor agencies has a positive

and significant relationship with the extent development is promoted in Delta and Edo States

### **Discussion of Findings**

With respect to the first hypothesis of this study, the study found that oil producing states development challenges has a positive and significant relationship with what promote development in Delta and Edo States This finding is consistent with the studies of David (2004); Kenny (2008) and love and Jacob (2008). The findings also agreed with Okoh (2012) study that revealed key challenges of development to be corruption insecurity and environmental challenges. Amongst other things, the detrimental effects of corruption to an economy cannot be overemphasized (Larsson, 2006). On the one hand, aid could generate incentives which perpetuate weak institutions, ease pressure to reform inefficient institutions, fuel high and rising corruption rates as well as aid-dependency, promote inhibitive bureaucracy, all of which impacts negatively on government efficiency and economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Heller and Gupta, 2002; Bräutigam, 2004; Clements et al., 2004; Harford and Klein, 2005; Moss et al., 2006; Rajan and Subramanian, 2007).

With respect to the second hypothesis of this study, the study found that that what constitute the development focus, rationale and objectives of international donor partners in the development of Delta and Edo States are the same. This is in line with the view of Sachs, (2005), that developing countries have critically challenged the ability of foreign aid in achieving its goals and that economic theories hypothesized that foreign aid is necessary to fill the financing or investment gap in developing countries and hereby lift the countries out of poverty trap. The third hypothesis reveals that the development goals and focus of international donor partners has a positive and significant relationship with the extent development is promoted in Delta and Edo States. This finding validates the work of Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) and Kosack (2013) who demonstrated, separately that most international donor agencies adopt same template for their developmental programmes across their country of benefactor. The findings also agrees with views of Amidt, Jones and Tarp (2007) that the growth in private and foreign investment has lead to valuable governance and economic development and also supported by the views of Burnside and Dollar (1997) that there exist a link between foreign assistance and economic development. In the same vein a UN Issue Paper (2007) also agreed that Aid has successfully supported poverty reduction and growth promotion in many countries (including Nigeria). Consequently, even if aid flows have not stimulated growth under all circumstances, they have had a positive effect on average.

With respect to the fourth hypothesis of this study, the study found that the development challenges confronting international donor partners has a positive and significant relationship with the extent development is promoted in Delta and Edo States. This finding is in agreement with previous studies conducted by Alesina and Dollar (2000); Beine, Dolquie and Rapoport (2001); Kenny (2008) and Kosack (2013), Akpomuvie (2011) and Oyediran and Nweke (2014). They all reveals that funding is critical to development and most international donor partner rely heavily on other funding partners before they can execute projects. Also, the finding of Missionary International Services News Agency, (2008), indicates that foreign aid is declining day by day. Rich countries have cut aid funds by 8.4%, in consideration of real value and inflation. Some years back,

the governments of the 22 economies that belong to the OECD donated about EUR 66 billion, which is about 0.28% of the GDP of the 22 donor countries of the organization; it was 0.31% of GDP in 2006. After rising steadily through the 1980s and peaking at \$60.9 billion in 1992, development-aid flows declined to \$59.2 billion by 1994. Members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) committed 0.30 percent of their combined GNP to development aid in 1994, the lowest rate in twenty-one years and less than half the international standard of 0.70 percent (Hook, 1996).

## **Conclusions**

The study examined the role of selected international donor agencies in the development of Delta and Edo States. From the findings of this study, we concluded that corruption and bad governance, political and ethnic interest in developmental projects, climatic factors, poor infrastructural foundations and the expanding insecurity as critical developmental challenges affecting the survival of projects and programmes in the oil producing states. And that the developments focus of these international donor agencies are the same in Delta and Edo States because their main focus is on alleviating poverty. The study also concluded that development challenges' confronting international donor agencies affect development is promoted in Delta and Edo States.

## **Recommendations**

Based on the conclusion reached in this study, the following recommendations were made.

- International donor agencies should intensify more effort to formulate policies and programmes to address developmental challenges in Delta and Edo States.
- International donor agencies should design programmes to broaden the knowledge of leaders in the states
- Delta and Edo states government should give the international donor agencies free hand to work and execute projects in the states
- Execution and citing of project should not be based on political influence, donor interest, but driven out of the crucial needs of the people
- Government should encourage donor agencies by providing the necessary basic development infrastructures, collaboration and funding for project execution

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